| Fall 2006 | CRN: 44172 |
|---|---|
| Lectures: | Tuesday and Thursday, 4:40-6:00pm, 209 Wellman. |
| Office hours: | Tuesday and Thursday, 2-3pm, 3055 Kemper. |
| Instructor: |
Hao Chen
<hchenATcs.ucdavis.edu> |
| Mailing list: | ecs235a-f06@ucdavis.edu
Web interface (for announcements from instructional staff)
|
| Newsgroup: | ucd.class.ecs235.d Web interface (for discussions) |
| Students: | photos |
Introduces modern topics in computer systems security. Prepares students to do research in computer security.
review". Include your name and the title of each paper
in the file.handin cs235 revmmdd
/path/to/your/reviewNote: reading is subject to change.
| Week | Date | Topic | Reading |
| 1 | Sep 28 | Introduction | None |
| 2 | Oct 3 | Buffer overflow |
StackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of
Buffer-Overflow Attacks. Cowan, Pu, Maier, Hinton, Bakke, Beattie, Grier, Wagle, Zhang. Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit. Aleph One. |
| Oct 5 | Principles | The
protection of information in computer systems. Saltzer and
Schroeder. (Only Section I.) Reflections on trusting trust. Thompson. Rudimentary treatise on the construction of locks. Tomlinson. | |
| 3 | Oct 10 | Access Control | Protection.
Lampson. Excerpts from the Orange Book. DoD. |
| Oct 12 | Capabilities; confinement | The
Confused Deputy. Hardy. A note on the confinement problem. Lampson. Capability Myths Demolished. Miller, Yee, and Shapiro. | |
| 4 | Oct 17 | Sandboxing | A secure environment for untrusted helper applications:
confining the wily hacker, Goldberg, Wagner, Thomas, and Brewer. Traps and Pitfalls: Practical Problems in System Call Interposition Based Security Tools, Garfinkel. |
| Oct 19 | Cryptography; Kerberos | Why
Cryptosystems Fail, Anderson. Designing an Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes, Bryant. | |
| 5 | Oct 24 | Protocol design | Prudent
engineering practice for cryptographic protocols, Abadi and
Needham. |
| Oct 26 | E-voting | Analysis of
an Electronic Voting System, Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin,
Wallach. Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective, Karlof, Sastry, Wagner. | |
| 6 | Oct 31 | Software security |
Shifting the odds: Writing (more) secure software. Bellovin. Improving Security Using Extensible Lightweight Static Analysis Evans, Larochelle. |
| Nov 2 | Language-based security | Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis Wagner, Dean. | |
| 7 | Nov 7 | Java Security |
Extensible security architectures for Java
Wallach, Balfanz, Dean, Felten Optional: Java security: from HotJava to Netscape Dean, Felten, Wallach. |
| Nov 9 | Worm detection | Automated Worm Fingerprinting, Singh, Estan,
Varghese and Savage. Inferring Internet Denial of Service Activity, Moore, Voelker, and Savage. | |
| 8 | Nov 14 | Worm propagation | How
to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time, S. Staniford, V. Paxson
and N. Weaver |
| Nov 16 | Virtual machines | Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted
Computing, Garfinkel, Pfaff, Chow, Rosenblum, and Boneh. | |
| 9 | Nov 21 | Virtual machines; Taint check | Practical Taint-based Protection using
Demand Emulation Alex Ho, Michael Fetterman, Christopher Clark,
Andrew Warfield and Steven Hand. Optional: Xen and the art of virtualization |
| Nov 23 | Thanksgiving. No class. | ||
| 10 | Nov 28 | Virtual machines | ReVirt: Enabling Intrusion Analysis through Virtual-Machine Logging and Replay George W. Dunlap, Samuel T. King, Sukru Cinar, Murtaza Basrai, and Peter M. Chen. |
| Nov 30 | OS security | An Overview of the Singularity Project. Galen C. Hunt et al. | |
| 11 | Dec 5 | Security usability |
A
Usability Study and Critique of Two Password Managers Chiasson and
Oorschot. Why Phishing Works Rachna Dhamija, J. D. Tygar and Marti Hearst |
| Dec 7 | Project poster session, 1131 Kemper. | ||
From time to time, we may discuss vulnerabilities in widely-deployed computer systems. This is not intended as an invitation to go exploit those vulnerabilities. It is important that we be able to discuss real-world experience candidly; students are expected to behave responsibly.
The campus's policy (and my policy) on this should be clear: you may not break into machines that are not your own; you may not attempt to attack or subvert system security. Breaking into other people's systems is inappropriate, and the existence of a security hole is no excuse.
I always welcome any feedback on what I could be doing better. You are also welcome to send me feedback anonymously.
hchenATcs.ucdavis.edu>