ECS 235A. Computer Security

Fall 2007CRN: 51193
Lectures: Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, 1:10-2:00pm, 1070 Bainer.
Office hours:Friday, 2-4pm, 3055 Kemper.
Instructor: Hao Chen <hchenATcs.ucdavis.edu>
Mailing list: ecs235a-f07@ucdavis.edu Web interface (for announcements from instructional staff)
Newsgroup:ucd.class.ecs235.d Web interface (for discussions)

Announcements


Description

This class introduces modern topics in computer systems security, and prepares students to do research on these topics. It plans to cover the following topics:

Requirements and Grading

Lectures

Note: reading is subject to change.

WeekDateTopicReadingNotes
1Sep 28Introduction
2Oct 1Principles The protection of information in computer systems. Saltzer and Schroeder. (Only Section I.) Jim Apple
Oct 3Buffer overflow StackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of Buffer-Overflow Attacks.
Cowan, Pu, Maier, Hinton, Bakke, Beattie, Grier, Wagle, Zhang.
Optional (no review necessary): Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit. Aleph One.
Daniel Martinez Villegas
Oct 5Static analysis Improving Security Using Extensible Lightweight Static Analysis. Evans and Larochelle. Manish Kumar Anand
3Oct 8 (Cache) Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Java ApplicationsUsing Static Analysis. Livshits and Lam. David Whiteneck
Oct 10Runtime analysis (Cache) Dynamic Taint Analysis: Automatic Detection, Analysis, and Signature Generation of Exploit Attacks on Commodity Software.
Newsome and Song.
Nina Gholami
Oct 12Static analysis (Cache) Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis Wagner, Dean. Philip Fisher-Ogden
4Oct 15Java security (Cache) Extensible security architectures for Java Wallach, Balfanz, Dean, Felten
Liang Cai
Oct 17Web security (Cache) Protection and Communication Abstractions for WebBrowsers in MashupOS. Wang, Fan, Howell, and Jackson. Anhad Preet Singh
Oct 19Sandbox (Cache) A secure environment for untrusted helper applications:confining the wily hacker.
Goldberg, Wagner, Thomas, and Brewer.
Paul Congdon
5Oct 22 (Cache) Traps and Pitfalls: Practical Problems in System Call Interposition Based Security Tools, Garfinkel.Daryl Posnett
Oct 24Privilege separation (Cache) Preventing Privilege Escalation. Provos, Friedl, Honeyman.Todd Williamson
Oct 26Network security (Cache) A Look Back at Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, Bellovin.Kefeng Tan
6Oct 29Worms (Cache) Inside the Slammer Worm. Moore, Paxson, Savage,Shannon, Staniford, and Weaver. Kevin Langley
Oct 31Botnets (Cache) A Multifaceted Approach to Understanding the Botnet Phenomenon. Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, Terzis.Taeho, Kwon
Nov 2Worm fingerprinting (Cache) Automated Worm Fingerprinting, Singh, Estan,Varghese and Savage. Pulak Chowdhury
7Nov 5Secure OS (Cache) An Overview of the Singularity Project. Galen C. Hunt et al. George Chen
Nov 7Capabilities (Cache) The Confused Deputy. Hardy.
(Cache) Capability Myths Demolished. Miller, Yee, and Shapiro.
Nov 9Cryptography (Cache) WhyCryptosystems Fail, Anderson. Jeffery Yuen
8Nov 12Veterans Day. No class.
Nov 14Kerboros (Cache) Designing an Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes, Bryant.
Nov 16Cryptographical protocols (Cache) Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols, Abadi and Needham.
9Nov 19Virtual machines (Cache) Whenvirtual is better than real. Chen and Noble.
Nov 21 (Cache) When Virtual is Harder than Real: Security Challenges in Virtual Machine Based Computing Environments.
Garfinkel and Rosenblum.
Nov 23Thanksgiving. No class.
10Nov 26VM application (Cache) A Virtual Machine Introspection Based Architecture for Intrusion Detection . Garfinkel and Rosenblum.
Nov 28E-voting (Cache) Analysis ofan Electronic Voting System, Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin, Wallach. Andreas Sæbjørnsen
Nov 30 (Cache) Designing voting machines for verification. Sastry, Kohno, and Wagner.
11Dec 3Usability (Cache) Why Phishing Works. Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst. Justin Becker
Dec 5Economics (Cache) Why Information Security is Hard -- An Economic Perspective. Anderson.
Dec 7 Poster session.

Warning

From time to time, we may discuss vulnerabilities in widely-deployed computer systems. This is not intended as an invitation to go exploit those vulnerabilities. It is important that we be able to discuss real-world experience candidly; students are expected to behave responsibly.

The campus's policy (and my policy) on this should be clear: you may not break into machines that are not your own; you may not attempt to attack or subvert system security. Breaking into other people's systems is inappropriate, and the existence of a security hole is no excuse.

Feedback

I always welcome any feedback on what I could be doing better. You are also welcome to send me feedback anonymously.


Hao Chen <hchenATcs.ucdavis.edu>
Last modified December 5, 2007.
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