ECS 227 — Modern Cryptography — Winter 2009

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1. Is the following notion of privacy achievable by a stateless, probabilistic encryption scheme? Scheme $\Pi = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ is *perfectly private against an adversary that asks two queries* if for all distributions on plaintexts $\mathcal{M}$ and all $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}$ and all $c_1, c_2 \in \mathcal{C}$,

$$\Pr[M_1 = m_1 \wedge M_2 = m_2 \mid C_1 = c_1 \wedge C_2 = c_2] = \Pr[M_1 = m_1 \wedge M_2 = m_2]$$

where M_1 and M_2 are sampled independently from $\mathcal{M}$ and C_1 and C_2 are obtained by encrypting them. (Assume that c_1, c_2 are restricted such that $\Pr[C_1 = c_1 \wedge C_2 = c_2] > 0$.)

2. Secrecy from a random shuffle. Alice shuffles a deck of cards and deals it out to herself and Bob so that each gets half of the 52 cards. Alice now wishes to send a secret message M to Bob by saying something aloud. Eavesdropper Eve is listening in: she hears everything Alice says (but Eve can't see the cards).

Part A. Suppose Alice's message M is a string of 48-bits. Describe how Alice can communicate M to Bob in such a way that Eve will have *no* information about what is M.

Part B. Now suppose Alice's message M is 49 bits. Prove that there exists no protocol that allows Alice to communicate M to Bob in such a way that Eve will have no information about M.

(What does it mean that Eve learns nothing about M? That for all strings κ, the probability that Alice says κ is independent of M: for all messages M_0, M_1 we have that $\Pr[\text{ Alice says } \kappa \mid M = M_0] = \Pr[\text{ Alice says } \kappa \mid M = M_1]$. The probability is over the the random shuffle of the cards.)

3. In class we informally defined the bit-commitment problem. Design a plausible bit-commitment scheme using a blockcipher that has n-bit keys and n-bit blocks, say AES-128.